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Abstract
First-price auctions have very recently swept the online advertising industry, replacing second-
price auctions as the predominant auction mechanism on many platforms. This shift has brought
forth important challenges for a bidder: how should one bid in a first-price auction, where un-
like in second-price auctions, it is no longer optimal to bid one’s private value truthfully and
hard to know the others’ bidding behaviors? In this paper, we take an online learning angle
and address the fundamental problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions, where
both the bidder’s private valuations and other bidders’ bids can be arbitrary. We develop the
first minimax optimal online bidding algorithm that achieves an O˜(
√
T ) regret when competing
with the set of all Lipschitz bidding policies, a strong oracle that contains a rich set of bidding
strategies. This novel algorithm is built on the insight that the presence of a good expert can be
leveraged to improve performance, as well as an original hierarchical expert-chaining structure,
both of which could be of independent interest in online learning. Further, by exploiting the
product structure that exists in the problem, we modify this algorithm–in its vanilla form statis-
tically optimal but computationally infeasible–to a computationally efficient and space efficient
algorithm that also retains the same O˜(
√
T ) minimax optimal regret guarantee. Additionally,
through an impossibility result, we highlight that one is unlikely to compete this favorably with
a stronger oracle (than the considered Lipschitz bidding policies). Finally, we test our algorithm
on three real-world first-price auction datasets obtained from Verizon Media and demonstrate
our algorithm’s superior performance compared to several existing bidding algorithms.
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1 Introduction
With the tailwind of e-commerce sweeping across industries, online advertising has had and con-
tinues to exert an enormous economic impact: in 2019, businesses in US alone [Wag19] have spent
more than 129 billion dollars, a number that has been fast growing and projected to increase, on
digital ads, beating the combined amount spent via traditional advertising channels (TV, radio,
and newspapers etc.) for the first time. A core and arguably the most economically impactful
element of online advertising is online auctions, where publishers sell advertising spaces (i.e. slots)
to advertisers (a.k.a. bidders) through auctions held on online platforms known as ad exchanges.
In the past, second-price auctions [Vic61] have been the predominant auction mechanism on
various platforms [LR00,Kle04,LRBPR07], mainly because of its truthful nature (as well as its social
welfare maximization property): it is in each bidder’s best interest to bid one’s own private value
truthfully. However, very recently there has been an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions
to first-price auctions, for a number of reasons such as enhanced transparency (where the seller no
longer has the “last look” advantage), an increased revenue of the seller (and the exchange), and the
increasing popularity of header bidding which allows multiple platforms to simultaneously bid on the
same inventory [Ben18,Sle19]. Driven by these advantages, several well-known exchanges including
AppNexus, Index Exchange, and OpenX, rolled out first-price auctions in 2017 [Slu17], and Google
Ad Manager, by far the largest online auction platform, moved to first-price auctions completely
at the end of 2019 [Dav19]. As such, this shift has brought forth important challenges, which do
not exist for second-price auctions prior to the shift, to bidders since the optimal bidding strategy
in first-price auctions is no longer truthful. This leads to a pressingly challenging question that is
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unique in first-price auctions: how should a bidder (adaptively) bid to maximize her cumulative
payoffs when she needs to bid repeatedly facing a first-price auction?
Needless to say, the rich literature on auctions theory has studied several related aspects of the
bidding problem. At a high level, the existing literature can be divided into two broad approaches.
The first (and also the more traditional) approach takes a game-theoretic view of auctions: it
adopts a Bayesian setup where the bidders have perfect or partial knowledge of each other’s private
valuations, modeled as probability distributions. Proceeding from this standpoint, the pure or mixed
Nash equilibria that model optimal outcomes of the auction can be derived [Wil69,Mye81,RS81].
Despite the elegance offered by this approach, an important drawback is that in practice, a bidder
is unlikely to have a good model of other bidders’ private valuations [Wil85], thereby making the
bidding strategy derived based on this premise infeasible to implement.
Motivated to mitigate this drawback, the second (and much more recent) approach is based on
online learning in repeated auctions, where a participating bidder can learn to adaptively make bids
by incorporating the past data, with the goal of maximizing cumulative reward during a given time
horizon. Under this framework, modeling repeated auctions as bandits has inspired a remarkable
line of work [BKRW04,DK09,BSS14,MM14,CBGM14,BKS15,MM15,WPR16,CD17,GJM19,RW19,
ZC20] that lies at the intersection between learning and auctions. For example, several recent works
have studied second-price auctions from the seller’s perspective who aims for an optimal reserve
price [MM14,CBGM14,RW19,ZC20], although a few papers have taken the bidder’s perspective in
second-price auctions [McA11,WPR16], where the bidder does not have perfect knowledge of her
own valuations.
However, the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions has remained largely
unexplored, and has only begun to see developments in two recent works [BGM+19,HZW20] which
obtained the optimal regrets of repeated first-price auctions under different censored feedback struc-
tures. Despite these pioneering efforts, which shed important light in the previously uncharted
territory of learning in repeated first-price auctions, much more remains to be done. In particular,
a key assumption made in these works is that others’ highest bid follows some iid but unknown
distributions to make learning possible, while it may not always hold in practice. Conceptually,
this is quite ubiquitous and easy to understand: many, if not all, of the other bidders can be using
various sophisticated (and unknown) bidding strategies themselves, thereby yielding a quite compli-
cated others’ highest bids over time, which may not be following any distribution at all. Moreover,
there may even exist adversarial bidders and sellers who aim to take advantage of the bidder, which
makes others’ bid depend on the behavior of the given bidder and further non-iid. Empirically, this
non-iid phenomenon can also be observed in various practical data, e.g. the real first-price auction
datasets obtained from Verizon Media in Section 6. Consequently, it remains unknown and unclear
how to adaptively bid in this more challenging adversarial first-price auctions, where others’ bids,
and in particular others’ highest bid, can be arbitrary.
Consequently, we are naturally led to the following questions: Is it still possible to achieve a sub-
linear regret against a rich set of bidding strategies in repeated first-price auctions where others’ bids
could be adversarial? If the answer is affirmative, how can we design an online learning algorithm
that adaptively bids in this setting in order to achieve the optimal performance? We address these
questions in depth in this paper.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our contributions are threefold. First, we study the problem of learning to adaptively bid in adver-
sarial repeated first-price auctions, and show that an O˜(
√
T ) regret is achievable when competing
with the set of all Lipschitz bidding policies, a strong oracle that contains a rich set of practical
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bidding strategies (cf. Theorem 1). We also illustrate the importance of the choice of the compet-
ing bidding policies in adversarial first-price auctions. Specifically, when the bidder is competing
with the set of all monotone bidding policies, which is another natural set of bidding strategies in
practice, a sub-linear regret in the worst case is impossible (cf. Theorem 6). Moreover, we develop
the first minimax optimal algorithm, which we call Chained Exponential Weighting (ChEW), to
compete with all Lipschitz bidding policies. This algorithm is designed by combining two insights:
a) in the problem of prediction with expert advice, the presence of a good expert can be leveraged
to significantly enhance the regret performance (cf. Theorem 3); b) a hierarchical expert-chaining
structure can be designed through more and more refined chains that gradually covers a wide enough
set of basis Lipschitz bidding policies that essentially replicates the performance of the best Lip-
schitz policy (cf. Theorem 4). These chained experts form a tree, with successive levels of nodes
representing larger and larger expert sets. The final O˜(
√
T ) regret performance is achieved both by
a careful choice of what each internal node and each leaf node would do respectively on the algorith-
mic front and by a delicate balance of regret decomposition through these nodes in the hierarchy
on the analysis front, leveraging in particular the fact that there exists a good expert among the
children of each node.
Second, although ChEW is near-optimal statistically, it is computationally infeasible as it needs
to deal with exponentially many experts in each iteration. To mitigate this drawback, we carefully
select an appropriate set of experts to exploit the possible product structure that exists in the
problem and provide an important modification of ChEW to form a computationally efficient and
space efficient algorithm, which we call Successive Exponential Weighting (SEW). Specifically, the
SEW policy enjoys an O(T ) space complexity and an O(T 3/2) time complexity (Theorem 5), both
of which are computationally efficient enough for it to run very quickly in practice. Furthermore,
the SEW policy bypasses the “curse of Lipschitz covering” suffered by ChEW without paying any
price in its statistical guarantee, retaining the same O˜(
√
T ) minimax optimal regret bound.
Third, we test our algorithm (the SEW policy) on three real-world first-price auction datasets
obtained from Verizon Media, where each of the three datasets has its own individual characteristics
(cf. Section 6). Without the aids of any other side information, we compare the performance of our
algorithm to that of three existing bidding algorithms, covering parametric modelings of the optimal
bids, as well as the natural learning-based algorithm given the iid assumption. Experimental results
show that each of the competing bidding algorithms perform well on certain datasets, but poorly
on others. However, our algorithm performs robustly and uniformly better over all competing
algorithms on all three datasets, thus highlighting its strong empirical performance and practical
deployability, in addition to (and also in our view because of) its strong theoretical guarantees.
1.2 Related Work
The problem of prediction with expert advice has a long history dating back to repeated games
[Han57] and individual sequence compression [Ziv78,Ziv80], where the systematic treatment of this
paradigm was developed in [Vov90,LW94,CBFH+97,Vov98]. We refer to the book [CBL06] for an
overview. Both insights used in the ChEW policy on prediction with expert advice have appeared
in literature. For the first insight that a good expert helps to reduce the regret, it was known
that data-dependent regret bounds depending on the loss of the best expert are available either
for constant [LW94, FS95] or data-dependent learning rates [YEYS04]. For the second insight on
the expert-chaining structure, the idea of chaining dated back to [Dud67] to deal with Gaussian
processes, and a better result can be obtained via a generic chaining [Tal06]. As for the applications
of the chaining idea in online learning, the log loss was studied in [OH99,CBL01], and [RS14,RST17]
considered the square loss. For general loss functions, the online nonparametric regression problem
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was studied in [GG15,RS15], and [CBGGG17] considered general contextual bandits with full or
censored feedbacks. However, a key distinguishing factor between the previous works and ours is
that the loss (or reward) function in first-price auctions is not continuous, resulting in a potentially
large performance gap among the children of a single internal node in the chain and rendering the
previous arguments inapplicable. Consequently, we use a combination of the chaining idea and the
good expert to arrive at an optimal policy statistically, which is novel to the best of the authors’
knowledge.
To reduce the computational complexity of running the exponential weighting algorithm over a
large number of experts, there have been lots of works on efficient tracking of large classes of experts
especially when the experts can be switched a limited number of times. A popular approach in the
information theory/source coding literature is based on transition diagrams [Wil96, SM99], which
are used to define a prior distribution on the switches of the experts. Another method with a lower
complexity was proposed in [HW98], which was shown to be equivalent to an appropriate weighting
in the full transition program [Vov99]. Another variant, called the reduced transition diagram, has
also been used for logarithmic losses [WK97, SM99] and general losses [GLL08,HS09]. Successful
applications of the previous methods include the online linear optimization [HAK07], lossless data
compression [KT81,WST95], the shortest path problem [TW02,KV05], or limited-delay lossy data
compression [LL01,WM02, GLL04]. We refer to [GLL12] for an overview. However, our setting
is fundamentally different from the above works: in the above works the large set of experts was
obtained from a relatively small number of base experts, while the set of experts is intrinsically large
in first-price auctions. Consequently, instead of applying the popular approach where one constructs
a suitable prior to ease the sequential update, we choose an appropriate set of experts and exploit the
novel product structure among the chosen experts to arrive at the desired computational efficiency.
For comparison with previous works [GG15,CBGGG17] on efficient chaining algorithms, the method
in [GG15] requires convex losses and gradient information neither of which is available in first-price
auctions, and [CBGGG17] used a different discrete structure to achieve an O(T 1.55) time complexity
at each round, which is more expensive than the O(
√
T ) complexity achieved by this work.
We also review and compare our work with the recent works [BGM+19,HZW20] on repeated
first-price auctions. Specifically, [BGM+19] studied the case of binary feedbacks, where the bidder
only knows whether she wins the bid or not after each auction. In this setting, [BGM+19] pro-
vided a general algorithm based on cross learning in contextual bandits and achieved the minimax
optimal Θ˜(T 2/3) regret. Subsequently, [HZW20] studied learning in repeated first-price auctions
with censored feedback, where the bidder only observes the winning bid price each time (i.e. the
price at which the transaction takes place) and cannot observe anything if she wins the bid. In this
slightly more informative setting, [HZW20] provided two algorithms from different angles to achieve
the optimal Θ˜(T 1/2) regret when the bidder’s private values are stochastic and adversarial, respec-
tively. Our work is different from these works in two aspects. First, we assume a full-information
feedback model where others’ highest bid is always revealed at the end of each auction, which holds
in several online platforms that implement first-price auctions (including Google Ad Manager, the
largest online auction platform) where every bidder is able to observe the minimum bid needed to
win. Second, and more importantly, we drop the iid assumption of others’ highest bids assumed in
both works and assume a much more general adversarial framework, which makes the distribution
estimation idea presented in both works inapplicable. In summary, this work mainly focus on how
to bid without any distributional assumption in reality, while the above works were devoted to the
optimal use of censored data in first-price auctions, thus the results are not directly comparable.
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1.3 Notation
For a positive integer n, let [n] , {1, 2, · · · , n}. For a real number x ∈ R, let ⌊x⌋ be the largest
integer no greater than x. For a square-integrable random variable X, let E[X] and Var(X) be the
expectation and variance of X, respectively. For any event A, let 1(A) be the indicator function
of A which is one if the event A occurs and zero otherwise. For probability measures P and Q
defined on the same probability space, let DKL(P‖Q) =
∫
dP log dPdQ be the Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence between P and Q. We also adopt the standard asymptotic notations: for non-negative
sequences {an} and {bn}, we write an = O(bn) if lim supn→∞ an/bn <∞, an = Ω(bn) if bn = O(an),
and an = Θ(bn) if both an = O(bn) and an = Ω(bn). We also adopt the notations O˜(·), Ω˜(·), Θ˜(·)
to denote the respective meanings above within multiplicative poly-logarithmic factors in n.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setting and main results of this
paper. In Section 3, we provide a bidding policy based on a chain of exponentially many experts, and
show that it achieves the statistically optimal regret bound. In particular, Section 3.1 emphasizes
the importance of the presence of a good expert on obtaining a small regret. Building on Section 3,
Section 4 presents a modification of the previous bidding policy and shows that a product structure
of experts at each layer of the chain leads to computational efficiency. Further discussions are placed
in Section 5, where in particular both possibility and impossibility results for monotone oracles are
obtained. Experimental results on the real first-price auction data are included in Section 6, and
remaining proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Problem Setup
We consider a repeated first-price auction where a single bidder makes repeated bids during a time
horizon T . At the beginning of each time t = 1, 2, · · · , T , the bidder sees a particular good and
receives a private value vt ∈ [0, 1] for this good. Based on her past observations of other bidders’
bids, the bidder bids a price bt ∈ [0, 1] for this good, and also let mt ∈ [0, 1] be the maximum bid
of all other bidders. The outcome for the bidder depends on the comparison between bt and mt: if
bt ≥ mt, the bidder gets the good and pays her bidding price bt; if bt < mt, the bidder does not get
the good and pays nothing1. Consequently, the instantaneous reward (or utility) of the bidder is
r(bt; vt,mt) = (vt − bt)1(bt ≥ mt). (1)
Note that in the reward function above, the bidder can only choose her bid bt but not the private
value vt nor others’ highest bid mt. In fact, we assume that the variables vt and mt can be arbitrar-
ily chosen by any adversary agnostic to the private random seeds used by the possibly randomized
strategy used by the bidder. This adversarial assumption eliminates the needs of impractical model-
ing of others’ bids or the private value distribution, and takes into account the possibility that other
bidders may use an adaptive bidding strategy and adapt their bids based on others’ behaviors. For
these variables, we assume a full-information feedback where the private value vt is known to the
bidder at the beginning of time t, and others’ highest bid mt is revealed to the bidder at the end of
time t. The first assumption is natural–the bidder typically obtains her private value vt for the good
once she sees it, provided that she has the perfect knowledge of her own preference or utility. The
1By a slight perturbation, we assume without loss of generality that the bids are never equal.
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second assumption holds either in open auctions where the auction organizer reveals every bidder’s
bid, or in many current online platforms (in particular, such as the Google Ad Manager, the largest
online auction platform) where each bidder receives the minimum bid needed to win, which in turn
is precisely the others’ highest bid mt (possibly plus one cent).
A bidding policy π consists of a sequence of bids (b1, · · · , bT ) ∈ [0, 1]T such that bt can only
depend on the current private value vt, all observable histories (vs, bs,ms)s<t, and her private
randomness. The bidder aims to devise a bidding policy π where its cumulative reward is close to
that achieved by an oracle who knows the entire sequence (vt,mt)t∈[T ] in advance and is constrained
to make bids that smoothly depend on vt. This performance gap between what the bidder’s policy
can achieve and what the oracle can achieve is formalized in the notion of the regret (of π):
RT (π) , sup
f∈FLip
T∑
t=1
(r(f(vt); vt,mt)− r(bt; vt,mt)) , (2)
where FLip is the collection of all 1-Lipschitz functions f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]: |f(v)− f(v′)| ≤ |v− v′| for
all v, v′ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the oracle’s strategy set FLip is fairly rich: the oracle can adapt the bid to
his private valuation of the good (hence he does not need to bid the same price throughout the time
horizon), subject to a mild and natural constraint that the dependence on the private value is smooth
(meaning that the bids should not differ too much if two goods have similar values). Meanwhile, the
restrictions on FLip are also somewhat necessary due to the following reasons. First, if the oracle
is allowed to bid any price depending not only on vt but also the entire sequence (vt,mt)t∈[T ], then
the best bid is always bt = mt for any t ∈ [T ], while the bidder cannot predict an adversarially
chosen mt based on her past observations. Second, if the bid bt of the oracle, as a function of vt,
can depend on vt in an arbitrary way without any smoothness constraint, then when the private
values (vt)t∈[T ] are all distinct (which occurs easily as the interval [0, 1] is a continuum) the oracle
can again choose bt = mt, reducing to the first case. Hence, the choice of FLip as the benchmark
class is both rich and meaningful.
2.2 Main Results
The central result of this paper is that, even if the bidder is competing against a strong oracle with
a rich set of strategies in (2) under adversarially chosen private values and others’ bids, an O˜(
√
T )
regret is still attainable for the bidder.
Theorem 1. There exists a randomized bidding strategy π such that for all sequences (vt)t∈[T ] and
(mt)t∈[T ] taking values in [0, 1], the following regret bound holds:
E[RT (π)] ≤ C
√
T log T,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the bidder’s private randomness, and C > 0 is an
absolute constant independent of T and the sequences (vt)t∈[T ], (mt)t∈[T ].
Since an Ω(
√
T ) lower bound of the regret is standard (see, e.g. [HZW20, Appendix B]), Theorem
1 shows that the near-optimal regret O˜(
√
T ) is achievable for the adversarial first-price auction.
Hence, Theorem 1 completes the theoretical picture of learning in repeated first-price auctions with
full information.
Despite the existence of a near-optimal policy in terms of the regret, Theorem 1 does not discuss
the running time of the policy π; in fact, the first policy we construct for Theorem 1 will provide
clear theoretical insights but suffer from a running time super-polynomial in T . The next result
shows that, by exploiting the structure of the oracle, this policy can be modified to achieve the same
rate of regret but enjoying a (close-to) linear time/space complexity.
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Theorem 2. There exists a policy π satisfying the regret bound in Theorem 1 with space complexity
O(T ) and time complexity O(T 3/2).
Hence, Theorem 2 shows that there is an efficiently computable policy which achieves the near-
optimal regret. We also comment that although the time complexity O(T 3/2) is not as good as
O(T ) that the most optimistic bidder may possibly hope for, it is generally not improvable. This is
because the continuous action space (i.e. all possible bids in [0, 1]) needs to be quantized into Ω(
√
T )
actions to ensure a small approximation error, while each of the action needs to be evaluated at least
once for each auction and therefore contributes to the overall O(
√
T · T ) = O(T 3/2) computational
complexity.
3 A Hierarchical Chaining of Experts
In this section, we construct a bidding policy in repeated first-price auctions and prove Theorem
1. In particular, we relate this problem to prediction with expert advice. Specifically, in Section
3.1, we show that in learning with expert advice, the presence of a good expert results in a smaller
regret compared to the classical setting. Section 3.2 then formulates the repeated first-price auction
as the problem of learning with a continuous set of experts, and shows that a simple covering
argument only leads to a regret bound of O˜(T 2/3). To overcome this difficulty, Section 3.3 proposes
a hierarchical chaining of experts so that in each local covering, a good expert helps to reduce the
regret and drives the final regret to O˜(
√
T ).
3.1 Prediction with Expert Advice in the Presence of a Good Expert
We first review the classical setting of prediction with expert advice as follows.
Definition 1 (Prediction with Expert Advice). The problem of prediction with expert advice consists
of a finite time horizon T , a finite set of K experts, and a reward matrix (rt,a)t∈[T ],a∈[K] ∈ [0, 1]T×K
consisting of instantaneous rewards achieved by each expert at each given time. At each time t ∈ [T ],
the learner chooses an expert at ∈ [K] based on the historical rewards of all experts, receives a reward
rt,at as a result of following the expert at’s advice, and observes the rewards (rt,a)a∈[K] achieved by
all experts. The learner’s goal is to devise a (possibly randomized) policy π = (a1, · · · , aT ) such that
the cumulative reward achieved by π is close to that achieved by the best expert in hindsight, or in
other words, to minimize the regret defined as
RT (π) = max
a∈[K]
T∑
t=1
(rt,a − E[rt,at ]) ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness used in the randomized policy π.
It is a well-known result that the optimal regret in prediction with expert advice is Θ(
√
T logK)
and can be achieved using the exponential-weighting algorithm [LW94], which randomly chooses
each expert with probability proportional to the exponentiated cumulative rewards achieved by
that expert. Now we assume an additional structure in the above problem, i.e. there exists an
expert who is good.
Definition 2 (Good Expert). Fix any parameter ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. In prediction with expert advice, an
expert a0 ∈ [K] is ∆-good (or simply good) if for all a ∈ [K] and t ∈ [T ],
rt,a0 ≥ rt,a −∆.
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In other words, a good expert always achieves a near-optimal instantaneous reward at any time,
where the sub-optimality gap is at most ∆. The first reason why we consider a good expert is
that the special form of the reward function in (1) naturally indicates a good expert in first-price
auctions. To see this, consider the scenario where the bidder is suggested to bid within a small
interval [b0, b0+∆], which can be a coarse estimate of the region in which the optimal bid lies. Each
bid b in this interval can be thought of as an expert who bids b at this time, and the learner aims to
find out the best expert in this interval. An interesting observation is that, the expert who always
bids b0+∆ is a ∆-good expert, as for any b ∈ [b0, b0+∆] and v ≥ b,m ∈ [0, 1] (note that a rational
bidder never bids more than her private valuation), it holds that (cf. equation (4))
r(b0 +∆; v,m) ≥ r(b; v,m)−∆.
Hence, even if we do not know which expert is the optimal one, we know that there is a good expert.
Note that here we also know who is the good expert, but we will show in this subsection that the
identity of the good expert is in fact unnecessary to achieve the better regret.
Another reason to consider a good expert is that the existence of a good expert improves on the
classical regret Θ(
√
T logK), which is the central claim of this subsection. It is straightforward to
see that when ∆ is super small (e.g. ∆ ≤ T−1) and the learner knows who is the good expert, she
may always follow the good expert safely, resulting in a total regret that is at most T∆. However,
this simple scheme breaks down when ∆ becomes large (though still smaller than 1), say, ∆ = T−0.1.
Before we propose a new scheme for reasonably large ∆’s, we compare the notion of the ∆-goodness
with similar notions in online learning and show that the classical regret cannot be improved under
other notions:
• First we consider the notion where the goodness is measured on average. Specifically, consider
a simple scenario where there are only two experts (i.e. K = 2), and the rewards of both
experts are stochastic and iid through time. Further assume that the reward distributions of
the experts are Bern(1/2) and Bern(1/2+T−1/2), respectively, but we do not know which expert
has a higher mean reward. Note that on average, both experts are ∆-good as the difference
in the mean rewards is T−1/2 ≤ ∆. However, standard information-theoretic analysis reveals
that any learner will make a constant probability of error in distinguishing between these two
scenarios, and whenever an error occurs, the worst-case regret is at least Ω(T−1/2·T ) = Ω(√T ),
which is independent of ∆ as long as ∆ ≥ T−1/2. Hence, reduction on the regret is impossible
when the goodness is measured through the mean reward, and the fact that the gap never
exceeds ∆ really matters.
• Second we consider another notion where there is a lower bound on the suboptimality gap, i.e.
when the best expert outperforms any other arms by a margin at least ∆ in expectation. In the
literature of stochastic bandits, it is known that better regret bounds such as O(∆−1 log T ) are
possible compared to O(
√
T ) [BCB12]. However, this notion is fundamentally different from
our definition of ∆-goodness: a lower bound on the suboptimality gap makes the detection of
the best expert significantly easier, while with only an upper bound, it might still be hard to
tell whether a good expert is the best expert.
• Third, we remark that correlated rewards among actions are not helpful in most bandit prob-
lems where only the reward of the chosen action is revealed. Specifically, Definition 2 implies a
special type of correlation among actions at each time, but with bandit feedbacks where only
the reward of one action can be observed at each time, the above correlations are always lost
and the observed rewards can be mutually independent through time. Hence, the correlation
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structure of Definition 2 can only be helpful in feedback models stronger than the bandit
feedback, such as the full information scenario we are considering.
Despite the above negative results, we show that the answer is always affirmative under our new
definition of the ∆-goodness. We illustrate the idea using a simple example.
Example 1. Let us revisit the scenario where there are K = 2 experts with iid rewards over time,
and expert 1 is a ∆-good expert. Without a good expert, the traditional successive elimination
policy [EDMM06] at time t will eliminate the probably bad expert whose average historical reward
is below the other by a margin of O˜(1/
√
t) and choose the other one, or choose either one if the
experts achieve similar rewards. The rationale behind the choice of the margin is that the difference
of rewards, as a random variable, always lies in [−1, 1] and is thus sub-Gaussian, and therefore t
observations help to estimate its mean within accuracy O˜(1/
√
t) with high probability. Hence, we
may safely assume that the better expert is never eliminated, and whenever the other expert is still
present at time t, its suboptimality gap is at most O˜(1/
√
t). As a result, the instantaneous regret at
time t is either 0 or O˜(1/
√
t), and the total regret is at most
∑T
t=1 O˜(1/
√
t) = O˜(
√
T ).
How does a good expert help in this scenario? It helps in two aspects. First, we may always choose
expert 1 by default unless we are fairly confident that expert 2 is better. Second, the estimation error
of the reward difference will be smaller, if expert 2 is indeed better than expert 1. In fact, the random
variable δt , rt,2 − rt,1 will always take value in [−1,∆] thanks to the ∆-goodness of expert 1, thus
if E[δt] ≥ 0 (i.e. the distribution of δt leans towards the right end of the interval), we have
Var(δt) ≤ E[(∆− δt)2] ≤ (1 + ∆) · E[∆− δt] ≤ (1 + ∆)∆ ≤ 2∆.
Hence, by Bernstein’s inequality (cf. Lemma 5), we have
P
(∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
s=1
(δs − E[δs])
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− tε
2
2(2∆ + ε/3)
)
.
This implies that the mean difference E[δt] can be estimated within accuracy O˜(
√
∆/t+1/t), which is
better than O˜(
√
1/t) without a good expert. Hence, the learner may always choose expert 1, and only
switches to expert 2 if its average reward exceeds that of expert 1 by a margin at least Θ˜(
√
∆/t+1/t).
As a result, if expert 2 is worse than expert 1, then it is unlikely that expert 2 will be chosen and
the resulting regret is small. If expert 2 is better than expert 1, then the improved estimation error
above shows that if expert 1 is still chosen at time t, then the mean reward difference is at most
O˜(
√
∆/t+ 1/t). Therefore, the overall regret is at most
∑T
t=1 O˜(
√
∆/t+ 1/t) = O˜(
√
T∆).
Remark 1. Notice the important fact that δt ∈ [−1,∆] always holds in the above example. If the
goodness is measured in expectation, i.e. δt ∈ [−1, 1] with E[δt] ≤ ∆, the better sub-exponential
concentration for the case where E[δt] ≥ 0 will break down.
Although in the above example the identity of the good expert is known, the next theorem shows
that the minimax regret reduces from Θ(
√
T logK) to Θ(
√
T∆ logK) in general.
Theorem 3. Let ∆ ∈ [T−1(1 + log T )2 logK, 1]. Then there exist absolute constants C > c > 0
such that
c
√
T∆ logK ≤ inf
π
sup
(rt,a)
RT (π) ≤ C
√
T∆ logK,
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where the supremum is taken over all possible rewards (rt,a)t∈[T ],a∈[K] ∈ [0, 1]T×K such that there
is a ∆-good expert, and the infimum is taken over all possible policies π. In particular, for any
∆ > 0 and the classical exponential-weighting policy πEW with a time-varying learning rate ηt =
min{1/4,√(logK)/(t∆)}, the following regret upper bound holds:
RT (π
EW) ≤ 4
√
T∆ logK + 32(4 + log T ) logK.
Theorem 3 implies that as long as there is a good expert with ∆ = o(1), the minimax regret can
be improved. Moreover, there is no “elbow effect” where the minimax regret stabilizes when ∆ hits
some threshold. Furthermore, this minimax regret is strictly larger than that of the special case in
which the rewards of all experts lie in a bounded interval with range ∆, where the minimax regret
is Θ(∆
√
T logK) by simple scaling arguments. Note that when ∆ ≤ T−1 logK, the simple policy
where the good expert is always chosen is already optimal, with a total regret T∆, thus the range
of ∆ in Theorem 3 is near-optimal.
The exponential-weighting policy πEW with a time-varying learning rate is as follows: at time
t ∈ [T ], each expert a ∈ [K] is chosen with probability
pt,a =
exp
(
ηt
∑
s<t rs,a
)∑
a′∈[K] exp
(
ηt
∑
s<t rs,a′
) .
In practice, the probability can be updated via the rule pt+1,a ∝ pηt+1/ηtt,a exp(ηt+1rt,a) for all a ∈ [K].
The reason why we choose a time-varying learning rate is to remove the algorithmic dependence on
the possibly unknown time horizon, which will be helpful in later algorithms. We remark that a
properly chosen constant learning rate ηt ≡
√
(logK)/(T∆) also works for Theorem 3 (even with
the optimal range of∆ ∈ [T−1 logK, 1]), which easily follow from the data-dependent regret analysis
of the exponential-weighting algorithm [LW94,FS95]; see also [CBL06, Theorem 2.4]. However, the
analysis of the shrinking learning rate is more involved, and we relegate it (as well as the minimax
lower bound) to Appendix B.
3.2 A Continuous Set of Experts
To formulate the repeated first-price auctions as prediction with expert advice, we first need to
specify the set of experts. However, unlike the classical setting where the learner is competing
against an oracle who takes the best fixed action, in first-price auctions the oracle’s action (i.e. bid)
can depend on the private value vt, which can be treated as contexts. Due to the existence of the
contexts, one cannot relate the first-price auctions directly to learning from experts bidding the
same price over time.
However, the contexts can be handled by considering a larger number, or even a continuous set,
of experts. Specifically, for each bidding strategy f(·) ∈ FLip (i.e. a 1-Lipschitz function from [0, 1]
to [0, 1]), we may associate it with an expert using this bidding strategy. In other words, we identify
the function class FLip as a continuous set of experts. In this way, the setting of repeated first-price
auctions coincides with that of prediction with expert advice: at time t ∈ [T ] with private value vt
and others’ highest bid mt, each expert f ∈ FLip receives a reward
rt(f) = r(f(vt); vt,mt)
with the reward function r(b; v,m) given in (1). Moreover, since both quantities vt and mt can be
observed at the end of time t, the rewards of all experts can be observed as well. Finally, although
the bidder is not restricted to choose from the experts, she is essentially doing so as for any price b
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she bids under the private value v, there exists some f ∈ FLip such that b = f(v). In other words,
it is equivalent to say that the bidder chooses the expert f at that time. Hence, let ft ∈ FLip be
the expert chosen by the bidder at time t, the bidder’s regret in (2) is equivalent to
RT (π) = max
f∈FLip
T∑
t=1
rt(f)−
T∑
t=1
E[rt(ft)], (3)
which is exactly the regret in prediction with expert advice.
A potential difficulty of the above formulation is that the cardinality of experts is infinite, thus
known results for a finite number of experts cannot be directly applied. However, one may suggest
that a finite set of experts may be sufficient to approximate, or “cover”, the entire set FLip, which
requires the following suitable notion of continuity among experts.
Lemma 1. Let F0 ⊆ FLip be the subset of experts f ∈ FLip such that f(v) ≤ v for all v ∈ [0, 1].
Then if f, g ∈ F0 satisfy g(v) − ε ≤ f(v) ≤ g(v) everywhere on [0, 1], it always holds that
T∑
t=1
rt(f) ≤
T∑
t=1
rt(g) + Tε.
Proof. We show that for any v,m ∈ [0, 1] and b ≤ min{v, b′}, it holds that
r(b; v,m) ≤ r(b′; v,m) + (b′ − b). (4)
In fact, straightforward algebra gives
r(b′; v,m) = (v − b′)1(b′ ≥ m)
≥ (v − b)1(b′ ≥ m)− (b′ − b)
≥ (v − b)1(b ≥ m)− (b′ − b)
= r(b; v,m) − (b′ − b),
establishing (4). As a result, since f(v) ≤ g(v) for all v ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
rt(f) = r(f(vt); vt,mt) ≤ r(g(vt); vt,mt) + (g(vt)− f(vt)) ≤ rt(g) + ‖f − g‖∞.
Now summing over t = 1, 2, · · · , T gives the desired result.
Note that the reduction from FLip to a smaller set F0 does not hurt: an expert who bids a higher
price than her private valuation can always be improved. Hence, in the sequel we may always work
with F0 instead of FLip. Lemma 1 shows that, if two experts are close in the L∞([0, 1])-norm with
an additional constraint that one expert always bids higher than the other, then the total reward
achieved by the expert with higher bids is essentially as good as the other one. In other words, if
we could find a finite set of experts Nε ⊆ F0 such that for every f ∈ F0, there exists some function
g ∈ Nε such that g − ε ≤ f ≤ g, then
max
f∈FLip
T∑
t=1
rt(f) ≤ max
g∈Nε
T∑
t=1
rt(g) + Tε.
The minimum cardinality of Nε is known as the ε-bracketing number of F0, which is characterized
in the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 ([KT59]). There exists an absolute constant CLip > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, 1), there
is a finite set Nε = {g1, · · · , gNε} ⊆ F0 with F0 ⊆ ∪Nεi=1(gi − ε, gi) and Nε = |Nε| ≤ exp(CLip/ε).
Remark 2. Although [KT59] only established the ε-covering number of general Hölder classes, the
extension to ε-bracketing numbers is straightforward, see, e.g. [VDVW96, Corollary 2.7.2].
Since the set of experts is now finite, standard strategies for prediction with expert advice can
be employed to obtain a finite regret in (3) against any expert in Nε. Consequently, recall that the
minimax regret of learning from K experts is Θ(
√
T logK), we have
RT (π) = max
f∈FLip
T∑
t=1
rt(f)−
T∑
t=1
E[rt(ft)]
≤ Tε+ max
f∈Nε
T∑
t=1
rt(f)−
T∑
t=1
E[rt(ft)]
≤ Tε+ C
√
T log |Nε|
≤ Tε+ C
√
CLipT
ε
,
where C,CLip > 0 are absolute constants appearing in Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, respectively, and
the last inequality is due to the cardinality bound in Lemma 2. Consequently, there is a trade-
off between the approximation error (which becomes smaller as ε decreases) and the regret against
expert set F0 (which becomes smaller as |Fε| decreases, or equivalently, ε increases), and the optimal
choice of ε = Θ(T−1/3) gives an O(T 2/3) regret. However, this regret is larger than O˜(
√
T ), showing
that a simple bracketing argument is not sufficient. In the next subsection, we will further make
use of the continuity among experts in Nε to effectively reduce the cardinality of experts.
3.3 A Hierarchical Chaining
In this section, we generalize the previous bracketing arguments to a hierarchical chaining of brack-
ets, where the continuity structure of experts is used not only in the final approximation step but in
all intermediate steps. The high-level idea is similar to [CBGGG17] (as well as more related works
in the introduction), while some modifcations are necessary to account for good experts.
Roughly speaking, instead of considering a single ε-bracket of F0, we construct M = ⌊log2
√
T ⌋
different brackets with different approximation levels ε1 > ε2 > · · · > εM in a hierarchical manner.
Specifically, for each level m ∈ [M ], let Nm be an εm-bracket of F0 as in Lemma 2, with cardinality
Nm , |Nm| ≤ exp(CLip/εm). We also adopt the convention that N0 = {f0}, N0 = 1 and ε0 = 1 for
m = 0, where f0 is any function in F0. These levels form a hierarchical tree structure where the
bidder (represented by the only element f0 ∈ N0) is the root, and each expert f ∈ NM has a chain
of “managers” fM−1 → fM−2 → · · · → f1 → f0 where
fm = arg min
f∈Nm
‖f − fm+1‖∞, m = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1, (5)
with ties broken arbitrarily. In other words, each function fm+1 ∈ Nm+1 picks the closest function
in the m-th bracket Nm as its manager, and fm+1 is called an employee of fm. We also call fm as
the manager of the expert f ∈ NM at level m, and by convention we have fM = f , and all elements
of ∪M−1m=0Nm are “managers” (internal nodes of the tree). Similarly, all elements of NM are called
“experts” (leaf nodes of the tree). In the sequel, we abuse the notation slightly and use fm to denote
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either the manager of a given expert f at level m or a generic element of Nm, depending on the
context.
As before, the experts f ∈ NM always use the bidding strategy f and receive a reward rt(f)
at each time t. However, the bidding strategy of any manager fm is no longer the strategy fm
itself, but a probability distribution Pt,fm over the experts that fm manages. In other words, at
each time t, the manager fm chooses to follow a random expert in NM according to the probability
distribution Pt,fm , which may depend on all observations up to time t−1. Hence, if we define Pt,f as
the Dirac delta measure on {f} for all f ∈ NM , the expected reward difference between the bidder
and any expert f ∈ FM at time t can be expressed as
rt(f)− Eft∼Pt,f0 [rt(ft)] =
M∑
m=1
(
Eft∼Pt,fm
[rt(ft)]− Eft∼Pt,fm−1 [rt(ft)]
)
.
Equivalently, the expected reward difference between the bidder and a fixed expert f is the sum of
the reward differences between the adjacent managers of f over different levels. Hence, the bidder’s
regret in (3) can be upper bounded as
RT (π) ≤ TεM +
M∑
m=1
max
fm−1∈Nm−1,fm∈Nm,
fm→fm−1
T∑
t=1
(
Eft∼Pt,fm
[rt(ft)]− Eft∼Pt,fm−1 [rt(ft)]
)
, (6)
where fm → fm−1 indicates that fm−1 is the manager of fm in the sense of (5). As a result, the
inequality (6) shows that the overall regret will be small if the expected reward difference between
any adjacent managers is small. In other words, all managers are under the setting of prediction
with expert advice and aim to achieve a small regret against their best next-level employees.
However, the naïve application of the regret bounds for prediction with expert advice to (6) will
still break down. This is because the number of employees of a manager fM−1 ∈ NM−1 can still be
as large as exp(Ω(1/εM )), the cardinality of NM , and therefore the regret of the manager fM−1 can
be as large as O(
√
T/εM ), still leading to an O(T 2/3) regret bound. Hence, the additional structure
that each manager has similar employees needs to be used. In fact, for each fm+1 ∈ Nm+1 with the
manager fm ∈ Nm, the εm-bracketing property of the set Nm implies that minf∈Nm ‖fm+1−f‖∞ ≤
εm. Hence, by (5), we also have ‖fm+1 − fm‖∞ ≤ εm. As a result, by the triangle inequality, if
f, g ∈ NM are two experts with the same manager fm = gm ∈ Nm at level m, then
‖f − g‖∞ ≤
M−1∑
r=m
(‖fr+1 − fr‖∞ + ‖gr+1 − gr‖∞) ≤ 2
M−1∑
r=m
εr.
In other words, the support of the distribution Pt,fm lies in a small L∞-ball with radius depending
only on the level m. An important implication of the above observation is that there exists a good
expert compared with all employees of fm. Specifically, for each fm ∈ Nm, define the dummy expert
f⋆m with
f⋆m(v) = max
f∈NM :f→fm
f(v), v ∈ [0, 1], (7)
where f → fm indicates that fm is the manager of expert f at levelm. Since the constraint f(v) ≤ v
and the 1-Lipschitzness are closed under pointwise maximum, we have f⋆m ∈ F0. Moreover, for all
experts f in the support of Pt,fm , it always holds that f
⋆
m−2
∑M−1
r=m εr ≤ f ≤ f⋆m, indicating that the
dummy expert f⋆m is ∆m-good compared with all employees of the manager fm thanks to Lemma
1, with ∆m = 2
∑M−1
r=m εr. Hence, for each manager fm we may include f
⋆
m explicitly as an expert
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Algorithm 1: Chained Exponential Weighting (ChEW) Policy
Input: Time horizon T ; number of levels M = ⌊log2
√
T ⌋; radii of brackets εm = 2−m and
suboptimality gaps ∆m = 2
∑M−1
r=m εr for m = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,M .
Output: A bidding policy π.
Initialization: Find an εm-bracket Nm of F0 with cardinality at most exp(C/εm) for
m ∈ [M ] (existence is ensured by Lemma 2);
for m = M − 1,M − 2, · · · , 0 do
for fm ∈ Nm do
Construct the dummy expert f⋆m in (7) and add it to NM ;
Set C(fm)← {f⋆m} ∪ {fm+1 ∈ Nm+1 : fm+1 → fm};
Initialize r0,fm(f)← 0 for all f ∈ C(fm).
end
end
for t = 1, 2, · · · , T do
The bidder receives the private value vt ∈ [0, 1];
Set Pt,f (f ′)← 1(f = f ′) for all (f, f ′) ∈ NM ×NM ;
Set learning rate ηt,m ← min{1/4,
√
CLip/(t∆mεm+1)};
for m = M − 1,M − 2, · · · , 0 do
for fm ∈ Nm do
For each fm+1 ∈ C(fm), set
Qt,fm(fm+1)←
exp (ηt,mrt−1,fm(fm+1))∑
f∈C(fm)
exp (ηt,mrt−1,fm(f))
. (8)
For each f ∈ NM , set
Pt,fm(f)←
∑
fm+1∈C(fm)
Qt,fm(fm+1)Pt,fm+1(f). (9)
end
end
The bidder samples f ∼ Pt,f0 and bids bt = f(vt);
The bidder receives others’ highest bid mt;
for m = M − 1,M − 2, · · · , 0 do
for fm ∈ Nm do
For each fm+1 ∈ C(fm), update
rt,fm(fm+1)← rt−1,fm(fm+1) +
∑
f∈NM
Pt,fm+1(f) · r(f(vt); vt,mt). (10)
end
end
end
and run the exponential weighting algorithm with a proper learning rate, which is expected to have
a smaller regret due to the presence of a good expert by Theorem 3.
The detailed description of the resulting policy, called ChEW (Chained Exponential Weighting),
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is displayed in Algorithm 1. For the initialization of the algorithm, we set εm = 2−m and construct
the hierarchical chaining of experts as above, with a dummy expert f⋆m added to each manager fm.
Hence, the set of employees of a manager fm consists of all individuals (managers or experts) at
level m + 1 with fm being their manager plus the dummy expert f⋆m, and is denoted by C(fm) in
Algorithm 1. Moreover, for each employee f of fm, we use rt,fm(f) to store the cumulative past
rewards of f up to time t, which is initialized to be zero. We also set the time-varying learning
rate ηt,m = min{1/4,
√
CLip/(t∆mεm+1)} for all managers at level m, where CLip is the absolute
constant appearing in Lemma 2. This choice is inspired by Theorem 3, as ∆m is the suboptimality
gap of the good expert, and CLip/εm+1 is an upper bound of the log-cardinality log |C(fm)| for all
fm ∈ Nm.
Now at each time t ∈ [T ], the ChEW policy proceeds as follows. First, we specify the randomized
policy used by all experts and managers in a down-to-top manner. For experts f ∈ NM (including
dummy experts), the bidding policy is simply to use f . For any manager fm, her bidding policy
is a proper mixture of those of her employees, where the mixture distribution Qt,fm over C(fm) is
obtained from the exponential weighting algorithm used in Theorem 3, i.e. the probability that an
employee fm+1 ∈ C(fm) is selected is proportional to her exponentiated past rewards, as shown
in (8). Next, since the bidding policy used by any exployee fm+1 ∈ C(fm) is a known mixture
distribution Pt,fm+1 over all possible experts f ∈ NM , the mixture distribution Qt,fm over employees
naturally induces a mixture distribution Pt,fm over experts for the manager fm as well, as shown in
(9). Now applying the previous procedure from the experts (leaves) to the bidder (root), we obtain
the final mixture distribution Pt,f0 used by the bidder f0, and the final policy is to randomly pick an
expert f from the mixture distribution Pt,f0 . Finally, since we assume a full-information feedback
where both the bidder’s private value vt and others’ maximum bid mt can be observed, the rewards
of all experts (and consequently all managers who use a mixture distribution over experts) at time
t can be observed. Hence, the cumulative rewards rt,fm(f) of all employees f of all managers fm
can be updated as shown in (10), and we move to time t+ 1.
The next theorem shows that the ChEW policy achieves an O˜(
√
T ) regret for repeated first-price
auctions, completing the proof of our main Theorem 1.
Theorem 4. For any time horizon T ≥ 1, the ChEW policy displayed in Algorithm 1 satisfies the
regret bound
RT (π
ChEW) ≤
(
2 + C
√
2CLip log T + 2CCLip(1 + log T )
)√
T ,
where the absolute constants C,CLip appear in Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, respectively.
The main ideas of the proof of Theorem 4 are sketched at the beginning of this subsection, and
we include the full proof here. Since for any m ∈ [M ] and fm−1 ∈ Nm−1, the mixture distribution
Pt,fm−1 used by the manager fm−1 is in turn a mixture over her employees, with the mixture Qt,fm−1
proportional to the exponential weights of the past cumulative rewards of the employees. Moreover,
among the employees there is a ∆m−1-good expert f⋆m−1. Hence, the regret upper bound of Theorem
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3 implies that
max
fm∈Nm,fm→fm−1
T∑
t=1
(
Eft∼Pt,fm
[rt(ft)]− Eft∼Pt,fm−1 [rt(ft)]
)
= max
fm∈Nm,fm→fm−1
T∑
t=1
(
Eft∼Pt,fm
[rt(ft)]− Efm∼Qt,fm−1Eft∼Pt,fm [rt(ft)]
)
(a)
≤ max
fm∈C(fm−1)
T∑
t=1
(
Eft∼Pt,fm
[rt(ft)]− Efm∼Qt,fm−1Eft∼Pt,fm [rt(ft)]
)
(b)
≤ C
(√
CLipT∆m−1
εm
+ (1 + log T ) · CLip
εm
)
, (11)
where (a) is due to the inclusion {fm ∈ Nm : fm → fm−1} ⊆ C(fm−1), and (b) is due to Theorem
3. Since (11) holds for all fm−1 ∈ Nm−1, the upper bound in (6) gives
RT (π
ChEW) ≤ TεM +
M∑
m=1
C
(√
CLipT∆m−1
εm
+ (1 + log T ) · CLip
εm
)
≤ 2
√
T +
M∑
m=1
C
(√
CLipT · 2−m+3
2−m
+ (1 + log T ) · CLip
2−m
)
≤
(
2 + C
√
2CLip log T + 2CCLip(1 + log T )
)√
T ,
establishing Theorem 4, where by our choice of εm = 2−m we have∆m = 2
∑M−1
r=m εr ≤ 2
∑M−1
r=m 2
−r <
2−m+2.
4 An Efficiently Computable Policy
Although the ChEW policy achieves the desired O˜(
√
T ) regret in first-price auctions, an important
practical concern is the running time. Specifically, even if one only looks at the bottom level of the
chain, there are exp(Ω(1/εM )) = exp(Ω(
√
T )) experts in total over which the exponential weighting
is performed, giving both space complexity and time complexity growing super-polynomially in T .
In this section, we overcome the computational burden by exploiting the possible product structure
among the experts, and propose an efficiently-computable Successive Exponential Weighting (SEW)
policy with the same regret guarantee. Specifically, Section 4.1 presents the basic idea of using the
product structure to help reduce computation via a simple example, and Section 4.2 details the
SEW policy which uses a product structure everywhere in the chain. The analysis of the regret and
the space/time complexity of the SEW policy is placed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Importance of Product Structure
To reduce the computational complexity of running the exponential weighting algorithm over a large
number of experts, there has been a lot of work on efficient tracking of large classes of experts. We
refer to the related works in the introduction. However, our problem is fundamentally different from
those in the above works in both the class of experts and the methodology:
1. The previous works mostly focused on a large class of experts (also called the meta experts)
obtained from a relatively small number of base experts, e.g. meta experts are formed via a
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limited number of switchings or a convex combination of base experts. In comparison, the
number of Lipschitz experts in first-price auctions is intrinsically large given by the oracle
class, and there is no natural and small class of base experts.
2. The previous works typically assumed a fix class of experts as specified by the problem setup.
In contrast, the choice of the finite set of candidate experts can vary in first-price auctions,
as different coverings of FLip will give rise to different sets of experts, and the bidder has the
full freedom to choose from different coverings.
3. In terms of the methodology, the previous works mostly constructed a special prior distribution
on the experts (instead of a uniform distribution) so that the probability update rule in the
exponential weighting can be written as a simple recursive form. In contrast, we will still stick
to the uniform distribution but choose a structured set of experts instead to ease computation.
To see how a structured set of experts helps in reducing the computation complexity, consider the
policy in Section 3.2 based on a one-stage covering of FLip. Without any structural assumption on
the experts, there will be exp(Ω(T 1/3)) experts in total with a prohibitive space and time complexity
to run exponential weighting. However, a simple fix is possible by considering the following experts
with a product structure:
P =
{
f : f(v) =
M∑
i=1
bi1
(
i− 1
M
< v ≤ i
M
)
, b1, · · · , bM ∈ B ,
{
1
M
,
2
M
, · · · , 1
}}
, (12)
where M = T 1/3. Equivalently, the set P consists of all piecewise constant functions on M equally
spaced bins with discrete values in the finite action set B. The set P of experts has a product
structure because to specify any element f ∈ P, it suffices to assign a separate value in B to each of
the M pieces. Consequently, the overall cardinality of P is |P| = MM = exp(O(T 1/3 log T )), which
is slightly larger than the bracketing number in Section 3.2. Now the overall policy is to run the
vanilla exponential weighting algorithm to the finite class P of experts.
Next we show that the simple modification still achieves an O(T 2/3
√
log T ) regret while reduces
the computational complexity to O(T 1/3) per round. For the first claim, note that any f ∈ FLip
has a good approximation in P: in fact, the function
f˜(v) =
M∑
i=1
min
{
b ∈ B : b ≥ sup
(i−1)/M<v≤i/M
f(v)
}
· 1
(
i− 1
M
< v ≤ i
M
)
satisfies f˜ ∈ P, and f˜−2/M ≤ f ≤ f˜ everywhere by the 1-Lipschitz property of f . Hence, Lemma 1
shows that restricting to the experts in P only incurs an approximation error of O(T/M) = O(T 2/3),
whereas the bidder’s regret compared to the best expert in P is O(√T log |P|) = O(T 2/3√log T ).
Hence the claimed regret bound is established for the new algorithm.
For the computational complexity, we claim that the new algorithm is equivalent to running a
separate exponential weighting on the actions B under each bin. To see this, note that the product
structure of P implies that the sum ∑f∈P can be effectively written as ∑(b1,··· ,bM )∈BM where f is
represented by a vector (b1, · · · , bM ) indicating the bids on each piece. Hence, let i(v) = ⌈Mv⌉ ∈ [M ]
be the index of the bin to which the value v ∈ (0, 1] belongs, in the exponential weighting algorithm
over the expert set P, the probability that the bidder bids price b ∈ B at time t is (recall that r(·)
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is the instantaneous reward function defined in (1))
pt(b) =
∑
f∈P:f(vt)=b
pt(f)
=
∑
f∈P:f(vt)=b
exp(ηt
∑
s<t r(f(vs); vs,ms))∑
f∈P exp(ηt
∑
s<t r(f(vs); vs,ms))
=
exp(ηt
∑
s<t:i(vs)=i(vt)
r(b; vs,ms)) ·
∏
i∈[M ]:i 6=i(vt)
∑
b′∈B exp(ηt
∑
s<t:i(vs)=i
r(b′; vs,ms))∏
i∈[M ]
∑
b′∈B exp(ηt
∑
s<t:i(vs)=i
r(b′; vs,ms))
=
exp(ηt
∑
s<t:i(vs)=i(vt)
r(b; vs,ms))∑
b′∈B exp(ηt
∑
s<t:i(vs)=i(vt)
r(b′; vs,ms))
.
For a fixed learning rate, it is clear that the last probability corresponds to running an exponential
weighting algorithm on the historic data {(vs,ms)}s<t:i(vs)=i(vt) with private valuations falling into
the same bin as vt, establishing the claimed equivalence2. For general time-varying learning rates,
there are small differences on the actual learning rate used in these two approaches at each time,
but both the analysis and the regret bounds are similar. Hence, from the algorithmic perspective,
the bidder only needs to maintain a probability vector for each bin, and at each time updates the
vector for the only bin where the current value vt belongs. Consequently, the overall algorithm takes
O(M2) = O(T 2/3) space and O(MT ) = O(T 4/3) time.
Let us make two observations from the above example. The first observation is that, whenever
the class of experts enjoys a product structure, the overall exponential weighting algorithm on the
large class of experts reduces to independent exponential weighting algorithms on multiple bins and
can thus be implemented efficiently. Hence, it is expected that if the employees of each manager
have a product structure in the hierarchical chain in Section 3.3, the overall bidding policy will be
efficiently computable. The second observation is that the experts in P are not Lipschitz, meaning
that they are not legitimate strategies of the oracle. In addition, there are some experts in P who
are far away from any reasonable (Lipschitz) bidding strategies, e.g. an expert who bids 0 when
v ≤ 1/M and bids 1 otherwise. However, what really matters is the approximation property of
P that every feasible strategy of the oracle can be well approximated by an expert in P. The
piecewise constant construction then shows that, forcing the Lipschitzness within each bin helps
ensure a good approximation property which is further determined by the number of bins, while no
further constraint across different bins helps maintain a product structure of experts. In the next
subsection, we will show that managers of different levels have different numbers of bins to capture
the Lipschitz constraint gradually.
4.2 The SEW Policy
Motivated by the above insights, we propose the Successive Exponential Weighting (SEW) algorithm
in Algorithm 2 taking the classical Exponential Weighting (EW) algorithm with shrinking learning
rates (cf. Algorithm 3) as a subroutine. A high-level description of the SEW policy is to divide
the algorithm into L = ⌊log2
√
T ⌋ levels, where different levels have a different number of bins and
different classes of experts. Moreover, similar to the ChEW policy in Section 3.3, experts at any level
(except for the last one) use a mixed bidding strategy and randomly sample from their employees.
2Given the equivalence, there is an alternative way to prove the claimed regret bound. Specifically, the cumulative
regret incurred at the i-th bin is O(
√
Ti log |B|), where Ti is the number of times that vt falls into the i-th bin. Since∑M
i=1 Ti = T , the total regret is O(
∑M
i=1
√
Ti log |B|) = O(
√
MT log |B|) = O(T 2/3√log T ).
19
Algorithm 2: Successive Exponential Weighting (SEW) Policy
Input: Time horizon T ; number of levels L = ⌊log2
√
T⌋.
Output: A bidding policy π.
Initialization: Set Mℓ = 2ℓ+1, Uℓ = 2ℓ+1 − 1,Wℓ = 2ℓ − 1 for ℓ ∈ [L], Iℓ,m = (m− 1,m]/Mℓ
for all ℓ ∈ [L] and m ∈ [Mℓ], bℓ,w = 2−ℓ(w + 1) for all ℓ ∈ [L] and w ∈ [Wℓ].
for ℓ ∈ [L],m ∈ [Mℓ] do
Initialize the visiting time Tℓ,m ← 0;
For u ∈ [Uℓ] and w ∈ [Wℓ], initialize cumulative rewards Rℓ,m,u ← 0, R′ℓ,m,w ← 0;
end
for t = 1, 2, · · · , T do
The bidder receives the private value vt ∈ (0, 1];
Step 1. Compute the exponential weights.
for ℓ ∈ [L] do
The bidder identifies m⋆ℓ ∈ [Mℓ] with vt ∈ Iℓ,m⋆ℓ , and updates Tℓ,m⋆ℓ ← Tℓ,m⋆ℓ + 1;
For all w ∈ [Wℓ], the bidder computes the probability vector
pℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w = EW((Rℓ,m
⋆
ℓ ,2w−1
, Rℓ,m⋆ℓ ,2w, Rℓ,m
⋆
ℓ ,2w+1
, R′ℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w
), Tℓ,m⋆ℓ , 2
1−ℓ) ∈ R4+. (13)
end
Step 2. Random action based on the exponential weights.
Initialize w⋆ ← 1;
for ℓ = 1, 2, · · · , L do
The bidder draws a random variable s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} from distribution pℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w⋆;
if s = 4 then
The bidder bids bt ← bℓ,w⋆ and break;
else if ℓ < L then
Update w⋆ ← 2(w⋆ − 1) + s and continue;
else
The bidder bids bt ← 2−L−1(2(w⋆ − 1) + s) and break.
end
end
Step 3. Update the rewards.
The bidder receives others’ highest bid mt;
for ℓ = L,L− 1, · · · , 1 and u ∈ [Uℓ], w ∈ [Wℓ] do
Compute r′ℓ,w ← r(bℓ,w; vt,mt) and update R′ℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w ← R
′
ℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w
+ r′ℓ,w;
if ℓ = L then
Compute rℓ,u ← r(2−L−1u; vt,mt) and update Rℓ,m⋆ℓ ,u ← Rℓ,m⋆ℓ ,u + rℓ,u.
else
Compute
rℓ,u ←
3∑
s=1
pℓ+1,m⋆ℓ+1,u(s) · rl+1,2(u−1)+s + pℓ+1,m⋆ℓ+1,u(4) · r′l+1,u. (14)
end
Update Rℓ,m⋆ℓ ,u ← Rℓ,m⋆ℓ ,u + rℓ,u.
end
end
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Algorithm 3: Exponential Weighting (EW)
Input: Reward vector (R1, R2, R3, R4); visiting time t ∈ N; suboptimality gap ∆ > 0.
Output: A probability vector (p1, p2, p3, p4).
Set learning rate η = min{1/4,√(log 4)/(t∆)};
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 do
Compute the probability
pi =
exp (ηRi)∑4
j=1 exp (ηRj)
.
end
As will be shown in the detailed description below, an important property is the product structure
at each level.
Before showing how to run Algorithm 2 sequentially, we first describe the set of experts (or
managers/employees, which we may interchangably use depending on the context) at each level. At
level ℓ ∈ [L], the continuous set (0, 1] of private values3 is partitioned into Mℓ = 2ℓ+1 equally spaced
bins (Iℓ,m)m∈[Mℓ]. Given each level ℓ and bin m, there are Uℓ = 2
ℓ+1 − 1 regular experts, indexed
by (ℓ,m, u) with u ∈ [Uℓ], who will play mixed strategies supported on the interval
Jℓ,u ,
(
2−ℓ−1(u− 1), 2−ℓ−1(u+ 1)
]
. (15)
In addition, there are also Wℓ = 2ℓ − 1 dummy experts, indexed by (ℓ,m,w) with w ∈ [Wℓ], who
always bid a fixed price bℓ,w = 2−ℓ(w + 1) inside the current bin. Then it remains to specify the
mixture strategies used by the regular experts, or in particular, the structural relationships between
managers and employees at adjacent levels. An example of the relationship is depicted in Figure 1.
Specifically, for any level-ℓ manager with bin Iℓ,m, at the next level the bin will be split into two
smaller bins Iℓ+1,2m−1 and Iℓ+1,2m. When the private value vt falls into one of the smaller bins, the
manager will be follow the advice from one of the four employees in that smaller bin: the upper
employee, the middle employee, the lower employee, and the dummy employee, represented by the
intervals/bids Jℓ+1,2u+1, Jℓ+1,2u, Jℓ+1,2u−1 and bℓ+1,u, respectively. Note that here the employees
have a product structure as the manager can choose from 4× 4 = 16 employees based on her choice
of employees in each smaller bin. In each smaller bin, the introduction of upper, middle, and lower
employees is motivated by the covering Jℓ,u = Jℓ+1,2u+1 ∪ Jℓ+1,2u ∪ Jℓ+1,2u−1 and the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Let ℓ ∈ [L− 1],m ∈ [Mℓ], u ∈ [Uℓ]. Then for any f ∈ FLip with f(Iℓ,m) ⊆ Jℓ,u, and any
m′ ∈ {2m− 1, 2m}, there exists u′ ∈ {2u − 1, 2u, 2u + 1} such that f(Iℓ+1,m′) ⊆ Jℓ+1,u′ .
Proof. We distinguish into three cases. If the image set f(Iℓ+1,m′) include some element in Jℓ+1,2u+1\Jℓ+1,2u,
then by the 1-Lipschitzness of f and |Iℓ+1,m′ | = 2−ℓ−2, the total variation of f in Iℓ+1,m′ is at most
2−ℓ−2. Hence, by construction of the intervals in (15), we conclude that f(Iℓ+1,m′) ⊆ Jℓ+1,2u+1. Sim-
ilarly, if f(Iℓ+1,m′) include some element in Jℓ+1,2u−1\Jℓ+1,2u, we will have f(Iℓ+1,m′) ⊆ Jℓ+1,2u−1.
If neither of the above cases holds, it is then clear that f(Iℓ+1,m′) ⊆ Jℓ+1,2u, as desired.
Lemma 3 implies that for any bidding strategy used by the oracle, its restriction on each small bin
is contained in the support of some mixed strategy used by an employee. Hence, using exponential
3For simplicity we assume that the private value is never zero, as bidding zero will be clearly optimal in that case.
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Manager
(ℓ,m⋆ℓ , u)
Iℓ+1,m⋆ℓ+1
Iℓ,m⋆ℓ
Middle Employee
(ℓ+ 1,m⋆ℓ+1, 2u)
Lower Employee
(ℓ+ 1,m⋆ℓ+1, 2u− 1)
Upper Employee
(ℓ+ 1,m⋆ℓ+1, 2u+ 1)
Dummy Employee
(ℓ+ 1,m⋆ℓ+1, u)
Figure 1: A pictorial illustration of managers/employees at different levels. Based on each manager
at level ℓ, the bin Iℓ,m⋆ℓ is divided into two small bins, where on each small bin the manager has 4
employees known as the upper employee, the middle employee, the lower employee, and the dummy
employee.
weights, it could be expected that the mixed strategy of the above employee is competitive to that
of the oracle restricted to the given bin. Hence, the key reason to introduce the upper, middle, and
lower employees is to fulfill the covering condition in Lemma 3 which further ensures that at least
one of the above employees is competitive to the oracle. The additional dummy employee is mostly
for technical purposes (similar to the dummy expert in Section 3.3) who serves as a good employee
compared with the other three employees with suboptimality gap at most ∆ℓ+1 ≤ 2−ℓ.
Now we are ready to explain the SEW algorithm sequentially. We keep track of the cumulative
rewards Rℓ,m,u of all regular experts (i.e. upper, middle, or lower employees), as well as those R′ℓ,m,w
for all dummy experts. Meanwhile, to determine the learning rate at each time, we also keep track
of the visiting time Tℓ,m for each bin Iℓ,m (note that a time-varying learning rate is necessary here,
as the bidder does not know in advance how many times a given bin will be visited in total). Now
each round is decomposed into three steps:
1. Compute the exponential weights: First, the bidder receives the private value vt at the be-
ginning of time t and computes the EW probabilities at each level. Specifically, for each level
ℓ ∈ [L], the bidder identifies the unique bin Iℓ,m⋆ℓ which vt belongs to. In this bin, there are
Wℓ = 2
ℓ − 1 groups of experts, where each group consists of 4 employees and corresponds to
a single manager at the previous level (cf. Figure 1). Within each group w ∈ [Wℓ], the bid-
der computes the probability vector pℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w = {pℓ,m⋆ℓ ,w(s)}s=1,2,3,4 of choosing each employee
based on the EW subroutine in Algorithm 3, where the learning rate is given by the current
visiting time Tℓ,m of the current bin (cf. (13)). We remark that only one bin is considered at
each level, and nothing needs to be done in other bins.
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2. Random action based on the exponential weights: Based on the above EW probabilities, the
bidder is now in a position to make a randomized bid in a top-down order. Specifically, the
bidder starts at level ℓ = 1, finds the bin I1,m⋆
1
which vt belongs to, and tosses a random coin
to decide which employee to follow in the only group of experts (as W1 = 1) according to
the EW probability p1,m⋆
1
,1(·). If the dummy employee is selected, then the bidder bids the
price b1,1 corresponding to the dummy employee. Otherwise, the bidder continues to level 2
and locates the group of experts corresponding to the chosen employee at level 1. Again, the
bidder follows a random employee in the new group based on the EW probability within this
group, and continues this process. This process terminates when a dummy expert is selected,
or the last level ℓ = L has been reached where each employee (L,m, u) deterministically bids
the midpoint 2−L−1u of the interval JL,u.
3. Update the rewards: Finally, the bidder observes the full feedback mt, and then updates the
rewards of all (regular or dummy) experts in a bottom-to-top order. Specifically, the bidder
starts from level ℓ = L and obtains the instantaneous rewards for all level-L experts who
make deterministic bids. Now the bidder moves to level L − 1, where all regular experts at
this level randomly follow the experts at level L with a known probability distribution. Hence,
the instantaneous rewards of all level-(L− 1) regular experts can also be computed according
to (14). This process can be continued until all instantaneous rewards are obtained, and then
the cumulative rewards can be computed accordingly.
In summary, the SEW policy runs the exponential weighting at each level for picking the expert
in the next level, and updates the rewards of a small portion of experts, i.e. those involved in the
corresponding bin. The performance of the SEW policy is summarized in the following theorem,
which completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. The SEW policy takes O(T ) space and O(T 3/2) time, and
E[RT (π
SEW)] ≤ (2 + 4C(1 + 2 log2 T ))
√
T ,
where C > 0 is the absolute constant appearing in Theorem 3.
4.3 Analysis of the SEW Policy
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5. We first analyze the complexity of the SEW
policy. For the space complexity, the initialization step needs to keep track of all cumulative rewards
of all experts, which takes
L∑
ℓ=1
Mℓ(Uℓ +Wℓ) = O
(
L∑
ℓ=1
22ℓ
)
= O
(
22L
)
= O(T )
space. As for other steps, only some temporary variables need to be stored each time for the unique
bin at each level, and therefore they require O(
∑L
ℓ=1(Uℓ+Wℓ)) = O(2
L) = O(
√
T ) additional space.
Hence, the overall space complexity of the algorithm is O(T ).
Next we turn to the time complexity. As before, the initialization step only involves the as-
signments of O(T ) variables and thus takes O(T ) time. As for the updates at each time, Step 1 of
Algorithm 2 evaluates the EW probability Wℓ times at each level ℓ ∈ [L]. Since the EW algorithm
(cf. Algorithm 3) only takes O(1) time to evaluate the probability vector supported on 4 elements,
Step 1 only takes O(
∑L
ℓ=1Wℓ) = O(
√
T ) time at each round. At Step 2, the bidder only needs to
sample a random variable at each round, which takes O(log T ) time in total. As for Step 3, each
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reward update in (14) only takes O(1) time, and thus it takes O(
∑L
ℓ=1(Uℓ +Wℓ)) = O(
√
T ) time
in total. Hence, the time complexity of Algorithm 2 at each round is O(
√
T ), and the overall time
complexity is O(T 3/2), as claimed.
Finally we show the claimed upper bound on the regret. It suffices to show that, for any oracle
strategy f ∈ FLip, the reward difference between the strategy f and the SEW policy πSEW is upper
bounded by O(
√
T log T ). To this end, we aim to construct a chain of policies π0, π1, · · · , πL, πL+1
with π0 = πSEW, πL+1 = {f(vt)}t∈[T ] and the reward differences between adjacent policies are upper
bounded. Specifically, based on f , let
f˜(v) =
ML∑
i=1
1
ML
⌈
ML sup
(i−1)/ML<v≤i/ML
f(v)
⌉
· 1
(
i− 1
ML
< v ≤ i
ML
)
be an upper approximation of f which is piecewise constant, where we recall that ML = 2L+1 as
given in Algorithm 2. Clearly, by the 1-Lipschitz property of f , it holds that f˜ − 2/ML ≤ f ≤ f˜
everywhere. Hence, let πL be the policy which bids f˜(vt) at time t, Lemma 1 gives
T∑
t=1
r(πL+1(t); vt,mt)−
T∑
t=1
r(πL(t); vt,mt) ≤ 2T
ML
≤ 2
√
T , (16)
where the last step is due to the choice of L = ⌊log2
√
T ⌋.
It then remains to specify the policies π1, · · · , πL−1. First, by the 1-Lipschitz property of f , it is
easy to see that the value difference of f˜ at adjacent pieces is at most 1/ML. Moreover, each piece
of f˜ is associated with a level-L expert on each bin. Therefore, following the same lines as the proof
of Lemma 3, any pair of the previous level-L experts on each level-(L − 1) bin is an employee of a
level-(L − 1) manager4. Consequently, we further have a sequence of level-(L − 1) experts on each
bin, and this process can be continued until we reach level 1. An example with L = 2 is illustrated
in Figure 2. Now let πℓ be the policy which follows the previously chosen level-ℓ experts inside each
level-ℓ bin, and it is clear that in this way πL exactly bids the same price as f˜ .
To upper bound the reward difference between each adjacent levels, we utilize the key property
that the experts followed by the policy πℓ+1 in each bin are employees of the expert followed by the
policy πℓ. Moreover, due to the presence of the dummy employee at each level, any level-ℓ manager
has a good employee with suboptimality gap at most 2−ℓ. Hence, for each ℓ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L− 1}, we
have
T∑
t=1
(r(πℓ+1(t); vt,mt)− E[r(πℓ(t); vt,mt)])
=
Mℓ+1∑
m=1
∑
t∈[T ]:vt∈Iℓ+1,m
(r(πℓ+1(t); vt,mt)− E[r(πℓ(t); vt,mt)])
(a)
≤
Mℓ+1∑
m=1
C
(√
Tℓ+1,m · 2−ℓ log 4 + (1 + log T ) · log 4
)
(b)
≤ C
√
Mℓ+1T · 2−ℓ log 4 + C(1 + log T )Mℓ+1 · log 4
≤ 4C
√
T + 4C(1 + log T )2ℓ, (17)
4This holds true even if a level-L expert is a dummy expert, while the level-(L− 1) manager is never dummy. See
also the seventh piece of Figure 2.
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π2
π1
Figure 2: An example of the chain of policies with L = 2. The dotted and solid lines represent
the 1-Lipschitz strategy f and its piecewise constant approximation f˜ , respectively. The small blue
rectangles (or segments for dummy experts) represent the level-2 experts associated with f˜ on each
bin, and the large red rectangles represent the level-1 experts associated with the previous level-2
experts.
where (a) is due to that the policy πℓ(t) is running an independent EW algorithm on the subsequence
vt ∈ Iℓ+1,m for each m ∈ [Mℓ+1], where πℓ+1(t) is one employee, and therefore Theorem 3 can be
applied with Tℓ+1,m =
∑T
t=1 1(vt ∈ Iℓ+1,m). The inequality (b) follows from the concavity of
x 7→ √x, and the last inequality plugs in the expression of Mℓ = 2ℓ+1 ≤ 2
√
T .
Finally, by (16) and (17), it holds that
T∑
t=1
(
r(f(vt); vt,mt)− E[r(πSEW(t); vt,mt)]
)
=
L−1∑
ℓ=0
T∑
t=1
(r(πℓ+1(t); vt,mt)− E[r(πℓ(t); vt,mt)]) +
T∑
t=1
(r(πL+1(t); vt,mt)− r(πL(t); vt,mt))
≤ 4CL
√
T + 4C(1 + log T )
L−1∑
ℓ=0
2ℓ + 2
√
T
≤ (2 + 4C(1 + 2 log2 T ))
√
T ,
and the arbitrariness of f ∈ FLip completes the proof of Theorem 5.
25
5 Further Discussions
5.1 Non-Lipschitz Reward
The only property of the reward function r(b; v,m) = (v−b)1(b ≥ m) used by our policy is that the
mapping b 7→ r(b; v,m) satisfies the one-sided Lipschitz property: r(b; v,m)− r(b′; v,m) ≥ −(b− b′)
for all v ≥ b ≥ b′ (cf. Lemma 1). In other words, the mapping b 7→ r(b; v,m) from the feasible action
b ∈ [0, v] to its associated reward has right derivative at least −1. In particular, we remark that
the above mapping is not Lipschitz in general, for this function has a jump and is discontinuous at
b = m. This remarkable difference differentiates our work from [CBGGG17], renders their techniques
inapplicable, and highlights the necessity of the good expert. In fact, if the reward function were
Lipschitz on the action, then the chaining arguments in [CBGGG17] lead to the regret
O
(√
T +
M∑
m=1
∆m−1
√
T
εm
)
,
for all experts with the same manager at level m receive rewards within a range of ∆m. In contrast,
with only the one-sided Lipschitz property, all experts with the same manager at level m may still
receive rewards within a range of Θ(1), but the presence of a good expert leads to a larger regret
O
(√
T +
M∑
m=1
√
∆m−1 · T
εm
)
,
with the dependence on the suboptimality gap inside the squared root. Hence, the ChEW (and
also SEW) policy still achieves an O˜(
√
T ) regret, which holds for general problems with the full
information and a one-sided Lipschitz reward.
5.2 Generalization to Monotone Oracles
In addition to the Lipschitz oracle FLip considered throughout the paper, there is also another
natural choice of the oracle, i.e. the monotone oracles FMono consisting of all functions f : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] such that v 7→ f(v) is monotonically increasing. In other words, a reasonable oracle should
be willing to bid a higher price if her private valuation of the good becomes higher. This class of
the monotone oracle is more practical as it includes common bidding strategies which start to join
the auction only if the private value exceeds some threshold. Also note that in the stochastic case
where others’ highest bids mt follow any iid distribution, it was shown in [HZW20, Lemma 1] that
the oracle who knows the distribution of mt always uses a monotone bidding strategy, meaning that
this assumption is automatically fulfilled.
However, the generalization to monotone oracles is not straightforward. The main reason is
that the function class FMono is not totally bounded in the L∞([0, 1])-norm, as the functions {1(v ≥
α)}α∈[0,1] are L∞-separated from each other. Consequently, we have the following negative result
showing that the worst-case regret against the monotone oracle is Ω(T ).
Theorem 6. There exists an oblivious adversarial sequence (vt,mt)t∈[T ] such that any policy π has
an expected regret at least Ω(T ) against the monotone oracle.
Proof. We choose the adversarial sequence as follows. Fix v1 = 1/2, and let mt be an i.i.d. sequence
with m1 uniformly distributed on two points {0, 1/8}. The rest of the private values vt are chosen
26
sequentially as follows: for t ≥ 2,
vt =
vt−1 + 2
−t−1 if mt−1 = 0,
vt−1 − 2−t−1 if mt−1 = 1/8.
As
∑
t≥2 2
−t−1 = 1/4, we have vt ∈ [1/4, 3/4] for all t ∈ [T ]. Moreover, the update rule of vt ensures
that if vt+1 > vt, then vs > vt for all s > t. Symmetrically, if vt+1 < vt, then vs < vt for all s > t.
Based on this observation, we claim that the best strategy of the monotone oracle is
f(v) =
1
8
· 1(v > vT ) +mT · 1(v = vT ).
In fact, as vt ≥ 1/4 > mt, the best bid (of any oracle, not necessarily restricted to be monotone) is
clearly mt at each time. We now claim that f(vt) = mt for the above strategy f . In fact, if vt > vT ,
the update rule of vt show that vt > vt+1, so it must hold that mt = 1/8 = f(vt). Similarly, if
vt < vT , it must hold that mt = 0, which is also f(vt). Finally, f(vT ) = mT clearly holds. Hence,
the strategy f is the best monotone strategy, and the cumulative reward is
∑T
t=1(vt −mt).
Next we consider any bidding strategy used by the bidder. Since mt is totally unpredictable
based on the history, the expected reward at each time is at most
E[r(bt; vt,mt)] = E[(vt − bt)1(bt ≥ mt)]
≤ max
b∈[0,1]
vt − b
2
(
1 + 1
(
b ≥ 1
8
))
= max
{
vt
2
, vt − 1
8
}
= vt − 1
8
,
where the last identity is due to vt ≥ 1/4. Hence, the reward difference between the monotone
oracle and the bidder is at least
∑T
t=1(1/8−mt), which has expectation T/16 = Ω(T ).
Theorem 6 shows that the non-compactness of FMono under L∞([0, 1]) leads to a linear regret.
Nevertheless, under any Lp norm with p ∈ [1,∞), the following lemma shows that FMono becomes
totally bounded again.
Lemma 4 ([BS67], or Theorem 2.7.5 of [VDVW96]). For each p ∈ [1,∞), there exists a constant
Cp > 0 such that the ε-bracketing number of FMono is upper bounded by exp(Cp/ε) for all ε ∈ (0, 1).
Based on Lemma 4, we prove that when the private values are stochastic with mild assumptions
on the density, then an O˜(
√
T ) average regret can again be achieved against any monotone oracles.
Theorem 7. Fix any q ∈ (1,∞] and L > 0. Let the private values (v1, · · · , vT ) be drawn from
some unknown distribution P with marginals P1, · · · , PT , and Pt admits a density pt on [0, 1] with
‖pt‖q ≤ L for all t ∈ [T ]. Then there exists a policy π = (b1, · · · , bT ) such that
max
f∈FMono
E
[
T∑
t=1
(r(f(vt); vt,mt)− r(bt; vt,mt))
]
≤ C
√
T log T,
where (m1, · · · ,mT ) is any adversarial sequence in [0, 1], the expectation is taken jointly over the
randomness of the private values and the bidder’s policy, and the constant C > 0 depends only on
(q, L).
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(c) Dataset C.
Figure 3: The histograms of the private value sequence (vt) in the three datasets, with the normal-
ization into vt ∈ [0, 1] and 100 equal-spaced bins.
Proof. Let p = q/(q−1) ∈ [1,∞) be the Hölder conjugate of q ∈ (1,∞]. If two functions f, g ∈ FMono
satisfy f ≤ g and ‖f − g‖p ≤ ε, then by Hölder’s inequality,
E [r(f(vt); vt,mt)− r(g(vt); vt,mt)] ≤ EPt|f(vt)− g(vt)| = ‖(f − g)pt‖1 ≤ ‖f − g‖p‖pt‖q ≤ Lε.
As a result, we may treat the ε-bracketing of FMono under the Lp norm as the experts, where the
same approximation property still holds in expectation. Then applying the ChEW policy with the
new collection of the experts gives the claimed regret bound.
6 Experiments on Real Data
We now demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed bidding policy on three real auction
datasets obtained from Verizon Media. To streamline the presentation, we first present in Sec-
tion 6.1 an overview and a visualization of the datasets, and then introduce in Section 6.2 three
other competing bidding policies for comparison. Finally, for the experimental results, we show in
Section 6.3 that each of the competing policy, despite performing well in certain datasets, behaves
poorly in others, while in contrast, our SEW policy enjoys superior performance on all datasets and
uniformly outperforms both competing policies.
6.1 Data Description
Our experiments are run on a total number of three auction datasets from the first-price auctions
on three real-world sites, where each dataset consists of the bidding data through the Verizon Media
demand side platform (DSP) during a one-month period from March 24, 2020 to April 22, 2020. For
business confidentiality, we do not intend to disclose the full data, nor the identities of the real-world
sites; we will refer to datasets A, B, and C instead. These datasets consist of around 0.54, 1.00, and
1.57 million data points, respectively, where each data point is a pair of scalars (vt,mt) including
the private value vt and the minimum bid mt needed to win for each auction. The private value vt
is computed by Verizon Media based on an independent learning scheme not relying on the auction,
and is therefore taken as given. The quantity mt is the minimum bid needed to win and is returned
by the platform after each auction, which is by definition the other bidders’ highest bid (possibly
including the seller’s reserve price and measured up to 1 cent). These datasets have already been
pruned to only contain data points with vt > mt, for otherwise the bidder never wins regardless of
her bids.
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(c) Dataset C.
Figure 4: The histograms of the minimum winning bid sequence (mt) in the three datasets, with
the normalization into mt ∈ [0, 1] and 100 equal-spaced bins.
Although we reveal little information about the datasets for business confidentiality, we provide a
visualization to illustrate the important points. Specifically, Figures 3 and 4 display the histograms
of the private values vt and the minimum bidsmt needed to win in three datasets, respectively, where
only the relative values after normalization are presented. We observe that histograms in different
datasets exhibit different properties. For example, Figure 3 shows that the empirical distribution
of the private values in dataset C has a large discrete component (i.e. taking relatively few values),
whereas those in the datasets A and B are closer to continuous distributions. Similarly, Figure 4
shows that others’ highest bids mt have a near-discrete distribution in dataset A, while in the other
two datasets the distributions of mt are more continuous. As we shall see in the next subsection,
these differences lead to varying performances for the two competing bidding policies.
6.2 Competing Bidding Policies
In the experiments we apply our SEW policy in Algorithm 2 to all three datasets, with learning
rate ηt = 5/
√
t∆ in Algorithm 3 and proper scalings to accommodate real ranges of the private
values and the candidate bids instead of [0, 1]. Below we introduce three competing bidding policies
covering both ideas of parametric modeling and nonparametric learning.
1. Competing Policy 1: Linear Bid Shading Policy. The idea of bid shading, referring to
the fact that bidders should bid less than their private valuation, is well-known in first-price
auctions [Slu19]. In general, the bid shading idea assumes a parametric model of the optimal
bid, where the simplest policy is the linear bid shading [ACK+18]. Specifically, the bidder’s
bid b = θv is assumed to be a linear function of the private value v, indexed by some scalar
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] to be learned. To determine the optimal parameter θ, we collect the past
data in a given time window (usually one day) and use a brute force grid search to find the
optimal parameter θ to maximize the total profit in the previous window.
2. Competing Policy 2: Non-linear Bid Shading Policy. The practical performance of the
bid-shading policy could be improved by introducing certain non-linearity into the parametric
modeling. To this end, we also compare with a recent non-linear bid shading policy proposed
in [KS20] motivated by domain knowledge: the parameter set is θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0,∞),
and the bid b takes the parametric form
b(v; θ) =
log(1 + θ1θ2v)
θ2
.
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Figure 5: The cumulative rewards (normalized to [0, 1]) as a function of time in all datasets, where
solid lines correspond to the SEW policy, dashdot and dotted lines correspond to the linear and
non-linear bid shading policies, respectively, and dashed lines correspond to the distribution learning
policy.
Since log(1 + x) ≤ x for all x > −1, the above policy achieves the bid shading over the entire
parameter set, with parameters θ1, θ2 controlling the degrees of bid shading. As before, we
use a brute force grid search to find the optimal low-dimensional parameter θ to maximize the
total profit in the past one-day window and use it for the current window.
3. Competing Policy 3: Distribution Learning Policy. This policy is nonparametric and
estimates the probability distribution of others’ highest bids (assuming that others’ highest
bids are stationary in a short time window). This idea is motivated by its theoretical optimality
in regret established in [HZW20] on stochastic first-price auctions with censored feedback.
Specifically, at each time t, let P̂ be the empirical distribution of others’ maximum bids in a
given time window, then current bid bt is chosen to maximize the expected revenue if mt ∼ P̂ :
bt = argmax
b≥0
E
mt∼P̂
[(vt − b)1(b ≥ mt)].
Note that this approach is entirely nonparametric, and is expected to have a sound perfor-
mance if the data is indeed stationary. In the experiments we always choose the length of
the time window to be one day, which is roughly the optimal length of the time window in
hindsight for all datasets.
Finally, we remark that as this paper is devoted exclusively to the understanding of the possibly
simplest first-price auction model without any external or side information, we are not comparing
with bidding policies aided by various sources of side information available in practice. The effects of
different kinds of side information on the auction performance are of both theoretical and practical
importance, and we plan to investigate them and incorporate general side information into our SEW
algorithm in future works.
6.3 Experimental Results
We plot and compare the cumulative rewards (normalized to [0, 1] to avoid information leakage) of
all four policies as a function of time in all datasets in Figure 5. We present a quick summary of
our key findings next:
• The non-linear bid shading policy outperforms the linear one in all datasets and achieves good
rewards in both datasets B and C, but it performs poorly in dataset A. To see why, recall
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Figure 6: The bar plots of the total bids and winning bids for the SEW, non-linear bid shading,
and distribution learning policies in dataset A, where the height of the blue rectangle represents the
number of bids made in the given range, and the height of the red rectangle represents the number
of wins achieved by the bid.
that Figure 4 shows a distinguishing feature of dataset A, i.e. a majority of others’ highest
bids are supported on a few prices. In this case, a good policy should identify these prices
and bid a bit higher than one of them, and others’ highest bid is the key contributing factor
to the optimal bid. In contrast, any bid shading policy results in bids relying too much on
the private values and fails to capture the discrete structure of others’ highest bids. This
phenomenon is further illustrated in Figure 6, where we plot the histograms of the total and
winning bids for each policy in dataset A. We observe that the discrete components of the
bids made by the SEW policy almost coincide with those in Figure 4(a), and the distribution
learning policy also makes mostly discrete bids. In contrast, the bids made by the non-linear
bid shading policy are still continuous, resulting in a smaller number of winnings and further
a poor total reward5.
• The distribution learning policy has a good performance in dataset A but performs worse in the
other two datasets. There are two reasons for this observation. First, when the distribution of
mt becomes more continuous, it is harder to estimate. Hence, for dataset A where the support
of mt is small, a better distribution learning performance is available, also giving a better
reward compared with the bid shading policy. However, the data in the other two datasets
are more continuous which lead to a poor performance. Second, and more importantly, the
real-world data are highly non-stationary. Specifically, the distribution of mt highly depends
on vt, so the estimator of the unconditional distribution of mt may not be accurate given a
specific vt. For example, in dataset A the correlation coefficient between the sequences vt and
mt is as large as 0.66, which is far from independence.
• As opposed to the above competing policies which may not work well in certain dataset, the
SEW policy is robust to the different natures of the datasets, and uniformly outperforms
other policies in all datasets. Specifically, when others’ bids have a large discrete component
(i.e. in dataset A), the SEW policy can learn this component quickly and achieves a much
higher (around 30% larger) total reward than others. Moreover, when others’ bids are mostly
5One may wonder that the average reward of each winning bid should be the right target as opposed to the total
reward, as bidders typically have budget constraints. However, in the current datasets, the budget constraints have
already been incorporated in the private values vt (meaning that vt is smaller than the true valuation in view of the
budget constraint), and this process is independent of the auctions. Therefore, the total reward is a more appropriate
criterion here.
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continuous, the SEW policy can still adapt to the new nature of data and outperforms the
non-linear bid shading policy by a margin around 5%.
In summary, both the bid shading and distribution learning policies suffer from certain problems
in some datasets, while our SEW policy enjoys a robust performance on different types of data and
performs uniformly better.
A Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma 5 (Bernstein’s inequality [Ben62]). Let X be a random variable with E[X] = 0,Var(X) = σ2
and |X| ≤ 1 almost surely. Then for each λ ≥ 0,
E[exp(λX)] ≤ exp
(
(eλ − λ− 1)σ2
)
.
In particular, if X1, · · · ,Xn are iid random variables with the same distribution as X, then
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ t
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− nt
2
2(σ2 + t/3)
)
.
Lemma 6 (Fano’s inequality [Fan52]). Let P1, · · · , Pn be two probability distributions on (Ω,F),
and Ψ : Ω→ [n] be any test. Then
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pi(Ψ 6= i) ≥ 1− I(V ;X) + log 2
log n
,
where V ∼ Unif([n]), and PX|V=i = Pi for all i ∈ [n].
B Proof of Theorem 3
B.1 Proof of the Upper Bound
We show that the upper bound of Theorem 3 holds with C = 132. Since the exponential-weighting
algorithm is symmetric to all experts, we may assume that expert 1 is good. Moreover, since both
the probabilities pt,a and the regret remain unchanged if we replace all instantaneous rewards rt,a
by rt,a − rt,1, we may assume that rt,1 ≡ 0 and rt,a ∈ [−1,∆] by the ∆-good assumption. Next, as
in the standard analysis of the exponential weighting, we define
Φt =
1
K
K∑
a=1
exp
(
ηt
∑
s<t
rs,a
)
, t = 1, · · · , T + 1.
To handle the time-varying learning rate, we also define
Φ′t+1 =
1
K
K∑
a=1
exp
(
ηt
∑
s<t+1
rs,a
)
, t = 1, · · · , T.
Then for t ∈ [T ],
Φ′t+1
Φt
=
K∑
a=1
pt,a · exp(ηtrt,a) = E[exp(ηtXt)], (18)
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where Xt is a random variable taking value rt,a with probability pt,a, for all a ∈ [K]. Since Xt ∈
[−1,∆] almost surely,
Var(Xt) ≤ E[(∆ −Xt)2] ≤ (1 + ∆) · E[∆−Xt] ≤ 2(∆− E[Xt]),
and therefore Lemma 5 implies that
E[exp(ηtXt)] ≤ exp (ηtE[Xt] + (eηt − ηt − 1)Var(Xt))
≤ exp (ηtE[Xt] + 2η2t (∆− E[Xt])) , (19)
where the last inequality follows from ηt ≤ 1 and ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2 whenever x ≤ 1. Combining (18)
and (19), we have
log Φ′t+1
ηt
− log Φt
ηt
≤
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a + 2ηt
(
∆−
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a
)
.
Moreover, as ηt ≥ ηt+1, the non-decreasing property of the map η ∈ R 7→ (n−1
∑n
i=1 x
η
i )
1/η for any
non-negative reals x1, · · · , xn leads to η−1t+1 log Φt+1 ≤ η−1t log Φ′t+1. Hence, the previous inequality
implies that
log Φt+1
ηt+1
− log Φt
ηt
≤
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a + 2ηt
(
∆−
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a
)
,
and a telescoping argument leads to
log Φt+1
ηt+1
− log Φ1
η1
≤
t∑
s=1
K∑
a=1
ps,ars,a + 2
t∑
s=1
ηs
(
∆−
K∑
a=1
ps,ars,a
)
≤
t∑
s=1
(1− 2ηs)
K∑
a=1
ps,ars,a + 2
√
t∆ logK (20)
for all t = 1, 2, · · · , T , and in the last inequality we have used ηt ≤
√
(logK)/(∆t) and
∑t
s=1 1/
√
s ≤
2
√
t. The previous steps are partially inspired by [GO07, Lemma 1].
Note that in the classical proof we only need to plug in t = T in (20); however, here the coefficient
of the expected instantaneous reward is changing over time, and it will turn out that the inequality
(20) with all t ∈ [T ] is required. The following steps are partially inspired by [ACBG02]. Note that
by definition of Φt+1, we have
log Φt+1 ≥ ηt+1 · max
a∈[K]
∑
s≤t
rs,a − logK,
and therefore (20) with Φ1 = 1 gives that for t = 1, 2, · · · , T ,
max
a∈[K]
∑
s≤t
rs,a ≤
t∑
s=1
(1− 2ηs)
K∑
a=1
ps,ars,a + 4
√
t∆ logK + 4 logK. (21)
We deduce the desired regret upper bound from the inequality (21). Since rt,1 ≡ 0, the LHS of (21)
is always non-negative. Consequently, for all t ∈ [T ],
St ,
t∑
s=1
(1− 2ηs)
K∑
a=1
ps,ars,a ≥ −4
√
t∆ logK − 4 logK.
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Hence, with the convention S0 , 0, we have
T∑
t=1
ηt
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a =
T∑
t=1
ηt
1− 2ηt (St − St−1)
=
T−1∑
t=1
St
(
ηt
1− 2ηt −
ηt+1
1− 2ηt+1
)
+ ST · ηT
1− 2ηT
(a)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
−4(
√
t∆ logK + logK)
(
ηt
1− 2ηt −
ηt+1
1− 2ηt+1
)
− 4(
√
T∆ logK + logK) · ηT
1− 2ηT
(b)
≥ −16
T−1∑
t=1
(
√
t∆ logK + logK) · (ηt − ηt+1)− 16(
√
T∆ logK + logK) · ηT
(c)
≥ −16
T−1∑
t=1
√
t∆ logK ·
√
logK
∆t3
− 16
√
T∆ logK ·
√
logK
∆T
− 16η1 logK
≥ −16(1 + log T ) logK − 32 logK
= −16(3 + log T ) logK,
where (a) follows from (21), ηt+1 ≤ ηt ≤ 1/4 and the increasing property of x ∈ [0, 1/4] 7→ x/(1−2x),
(b) is due to the elementary inequality
x
1− 2x −
y
1− 2y =
x− y
(1− 2x)(1 − 2y) ≤ 4(x− y)
for 1/4 ≥ x ≥ y > 0, and (c) follows from the choice of ηt and t−1/2 − (t+ 1)−1/2 ≤ t−3/2. Hence,
now choosing t = T in (21), we obtain
max
a∈[K]
∑
s≤t
rs,a −
T∑
t=1
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a ≤ 4
√
T∆ logK + 4 logK − 2
T∑
t=1
ηt
K∑
a=1
pt,art,a
≤ 4
√
T∆ logK + 32(4 + log T ) logK,
giving the second statement of Theorem 3. Since it is further upper bounded by 132
√
T∆ logK as
long as ∆ ≥ T−1(1 + log T )2 logK, we arrive at the claimed upper bound.
B.2 Proof of the Lower Bound
The main result of this section is to show that the Θ(
√
T∆ logK) regret is minimax rate-optimal,
with the constant c = 1/16 in Theorem 3.
The lower bound proof relies on a standard application of testing multiple hypotheses, where the
learner cannot distinguish between a carefully designed class of reward distributions and therefore
incurs a large regret. Specifically, consider the following class of expert rewards (rt,a)t∈[T ],a∈[K]: for
each t ∈ [T ], the reward vector (rt,a)a∈[K] is random and follows the following joint distribution:
1. with probability 12 , the reward vector is (1−∆, 1, · · · , 1);
2. with probability 1−4∆2(1−2∆) , the reward vector is (0, 0, · · · , 0);
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3. with remaining probability ∆1−2∆ , the reward vector is (1−∆, r2, · · · , rK), where ri ∼ Bern(pi)
for i = 2, 3, · · · ,K are mutually independent.
Moreover, the rewards across different times are mutually independent. To ensure all probabilities
lie in [0, 1], we assume throughout this subsection that ∆ ≤ 1/4, as a smaller ∆ always makes the
minimax regret smaller and thus suffices for the proof of the lower bound. The construction above
satisfies two properties: first, expert 1 is always ∆-good; second, the expected reward of the expert
i ∈ [K] is
E[rt,i] =

1−∆
2(1−2∆) if i = 1,
1−∆
2(1−2∆) +
∆
1−2∆
(
pi − 12
)
if 2 ≤ i ≤ K.
(22)
As a result, the vector (p2, · · · , pK) modulates the reward information of the experts.
Next, we choose K different sets of parameters (p2, · · · , pK) that correspond to different scenar-
ios, with the following specific choices:
p
(j)
i =
1
2
− δ + 2δ · 1(i = j), i ∈ {2, 3, · · · ,K}, j ∈ [K],
where δ ∈ (0, 1/4) is some parameter yet to be chosen. The main properties of the above construction
are as follows:
1. For j ∈ [K], expert j has the highest expected reward in the j-th scenario, and choosing any
other expert incurs an instantaneous (pseudo-)regret at least 2∆δ according to (22);
2. For j = 2, · · · ,K, the j-th scenario differs from the first one only through the choice of pj .
Let E(j) denote the expectation under the j-th scenario, and P(j) denote the corresponding expec-
tation. Then for any policy π = (a1, · · · , aT ), we have
sup
(rt,a)
RT (π)
(a)
≥ 1
K
K∑
j=1
E
(j)[RT (π)]
=
1
K
K∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
E
(j)
[
max
a∈[K]
rt,a − rt,at
]
(b)
≥ 1
K
K∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
[
max
a∈[K]
E
(j)[rt,a]− E(j)[rt,at ]
]
(c)
≥ 1
K
K∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
2∆δ · P(j)(at 6= j)
(d)
≥ 2T∆ · δ
(
1− I(V ;X) + log 2
logK
)
, (23)
where (a) follows from the fact that the maximum is no smaller than the average, (b) follows from
the linearity of expectation and the inequality E[maxnXn] ≥ maxn E[Xn], (c) follows from the first
property of the choice of P(j), and (d) is due to the Fano’s inequality (cf. Lemma 6 in the appendix)
applied to V ∼ Unif([K]), X = (rt,a)t∈[T ],a∈[K], and PX|V=j = P(j). By (23), it suffices to prove an
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upper bound of the mutual information I(V ;X). Using the variational representation of the mutual
information I(V ;X) = minQX EV [DKL(PX|V ‖QX)], we have
I(V ;X) ≤ 1
K
K∑
j=1
DKL(P
(j)‖P(1))
(a)
=
1
K
K∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
DKL(P
(j)
t ‖P(1)t )
(b)
≤ 1
K
K∑
j=2
T∑
t=1
∆
1− 2∆ ·DKL(Bern(1/2 + δ)‖Bern(1/2 − δ))
(c)
≤ 2T∆ · 32δ2, (24)
where (a) is due to the chain rule of the KL divergence where P(j)t denotes the distribution of rewards
at time t in the j-th scenario, (b) follows from the second property of P(j) and the data processing
inequality, and (c) follows from 1−2∆ ≥ 1/2 and DKL(Bern(1/2+ δ)‖Bern(1/2− δ)) ≤ 32δ2 as long
as δ ≤ 1/4. Finally, combining (23), (24) and choosing
δ =
1
16
√
logK
T∆
≤ 1
4
gives the claimed lower bound in Theorem 3 with c = 1/16.
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